MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII KANEOHE BAY, Hawaii -- By all accounts, the Sunday morning of Dec. 7, 1941, prior to about 6:49 a.m., began as many others in the islands-calm, peaceful and pleasant.Three squadrons were assigned to what was then Kaneohe Naval Air Station: Patrol Squadrons 11, 12 and 14. Each had 12 PBY Catalina seaplanes, long range reconnaissance flying boats. Their mission was to patrol the Pacific's waters surrounding Hawaii.Yet, economic tensions had been growing between the U.S. and Japan, ever since Japan had invaded China in 1937. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration viewed Nazi Germany as a grave threat in 1939, but the American people did not want to be involved in a foreign war.Theories and speculation abound as to what went wrong and about why there was such tremendous loss of life on "the date that will live in infamy." Primary among the reasons given are the failings of the Pearl Harbor commanders and the conspiracy theory.Many believe that Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel and Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short failed miserably in responding to available intelligence reports. They had received several warnings that war was possible, in particular a Nov. 27, 1941, message called the "War Warning." A mini-submarine had even been sunk trying to enter Pearl Harbor, about an hour prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, of which they had knowledge. Others believe that Roosevelt, together with his inner circle of strategists, was aware of the impending attack and allowed specific events to transpire ensuring America would enter the war in Europe. They believe the president and his top advisors intentionally withheld vital and timely information from the Oahu commanders, information which would have caused them to place their commands at the highest state of alert. Lending credence to this belief, the administration had issued to Japan what was as an ultimatum on Nov. 26.According to military records, Oahu's army and navy commanders feared internal sabotage. At Kaneohe, airfield commanders received orders to park their aircraft wing tip to wing tip for closer security.The commanders had received orders "not to alarm civilians ... or to reveal ... intent. Short notified Washington of his plan to protect his forces only against sabotage," according to David C. Richardson in American Heritage. However, Richardson argues, Short would have had readied "his pursuit aircraft, to plan for and execute a flyaway of all other aircraft. And, indeed, Kimmel might have sorted [the fleet]," had information been forthcoming. Richardson also reminds that, operationally, Japan had the advantage, as forces had been deployed to Wake, Midway and Johnson Islands as well as to the Atlantic to support Britain.Morton A. Kaplan, publisher of The World & I, also believes the administration was "the mastermind of this plot," as well as Robert B. Stinnett, author of Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor. Kaplan cites that cryptologists had broken the Japanese code; most of the revealing deciphering was not sent to Kimmel and Short. Yet, he suggests that Roosevelt acted for the greater good, "doing what his office demanded: protecting American institutions and values" against fascism.The attack on Pearl Harbor is often used by academia as a case study in subjects from politics to economics to communication. For example in a communication text author, Dr. William V. Haney asks students to analyze Hugh Russell Fraser's American Mercury published in August 1957. Fraser explores more than "some radar warning." He recalls Oahu's uninstalled, permanent radar equipment; a negligent colonel who commanded the Corps of Engineers; a late duty shift relief; and a lone private manning what was then Fort Shafter's Army Information Center. The sole officer on duty, Lt. Kermit Tyler, read a book in another room.Regarding the 56-minute early radar warning, Tyler would tell the private, "It's all right, never mind," when he was alerted of the hundreds of blips appearing on radar north of Pearl Harbor. Tyler believed the blips to be a flight of B-17s due in from the mainland.So what can we be sure of?At Kaneohe Naval Air Station, totally surprised personnel raced to return fire from machineguns during two waves of attacks."Sunday morning was shattered by the roar of aircraft and exploding bombs," recalled Marine Tech. Sgt. Frank Fiddler in "A Study of the Land" in 1956. "At Kaneohe, an echelon of 12 Japanese planes swooped in from seaward between 7:45 and 7:50 a.m.," Fiddler remembered it. "Officials were quoted as saying they were unable to get a single plane off the ground to meet them because of the sudden attack."The first raiders flew so low they had to zoom upward to strafe Kansas Tower, where one man was injured and later died," Fiddler continued.Now 60 years removed from these incidents, determining whether inadequate information, miscalculations or miscommunication caused the change of events is left to a new generation of Americans to explore and ponder as to what went wrong. They will find that some of the answers are elusive.